Courtesy of Centurion Risk Assessment Services, Ltd.
GENERAL
The threat level to all personnel working in Iraq remains high. Attacks by armed groups and terrorists, etc. are consistent with the general consensus that their use of IEDs and small arms shows their increased sophistication.
Attacks on coalition forces continue on a daily basis, both by day and by night, consisting of IEDs, RPGs, hand grenades, small arms and mortar fire.
Many reports show an increase in the use of IEDs including daisy-chained IEDs using tripwires.
Reports are still coming in predicting future attacks on civilians as well as the continuing threat against security forces.
The area in and around Baghdad continues to experience a higher level of attacks.
The three main areas of attacks are still concentrated in Baghdad City, Ramadi and Fallujah.
There is a definite increase on the use of mortars and RPGs against the more static targets guarded by security forces such as security bases, etc.
Convoys traveling to the Turkish border have gone without incident so far and this route is still the safest road in and out of Iraq. However, coalition convoys have been attacked on numerous occasions. The roads are in pretty bad shape and have a lot of traffic between Mosul and the border.
CURRENT THREATS
Iraqis in and around the area of Fallujah have witnessed several incidents between locals and terrorist elements. There seems to be a lot of mistrust and suspicion between people in the town itself and the coalition forces. This may have something to do with Fallujah being in a state of disrepair and at present isolated from any changes that have and are being made to other areas within Iraq. Even though the security forces/CPA/NGOs are working for better liaison and improved safety, it is advisable to stay out of the area until the CPA informs otherwise.
Continued sabotage threat against soft targets such as infrastructures is reported throughout Iraq. Targets have included water pipes, electricity power lines and substations as well as oil lines. Reports indicate that these continuing attacks on security forces could be the testing of the attackers’ weapons and also testing and adjusting the range to the intended targets. It is also worth mentioning that terrorist groups are stockpiling weapons and continually training in order to implement bigger and more spectacular attacks in the immediate future.
Mosul area remains tense and still volatile. The area around Erbil is still tense but relatively quiet. Hilla remains volatile with attacks against security forces continuing; groups operating around there are the typical Shia militia.
CONVOY – VEHICLE SECURITY
Most ambushes on vehicles and convoys are initiated by IEDs or RPGs (sometimes both), followed immediately by small arms fire.
Mention was made in a previous report that vehicles were hijacked and taken away, possibly to be used for vehicle bombs. It has been reported that a white Nissan vehicle with the registration 9350 is in the Kirkuk area and being prepared for such an incident. Again, extreme vigilance is required for all suspicious vehicles, packages and items.
An incident occurred recently involving an armed civilian convoy close to Mosul. It was stopped at a checkpoint by armed Iraqi Security Forces. These guards were reported to be in an aggressive mood and asked if there were any Americans on the vehicles. The Iraqis then ordered all of the convoy to a location which was obscured from the road itself, however the convoy security refused to go. The armed personnel on the convoy stated that the occupants were all British and Iraqis, and eventually the convoy was allowed to proceed on its way. These armed Iraqi guards presumably would have been on the side of the coalition forces – but questions need to be asked about their overall intention.
A military convoy was ambushed, the attack being initiated by an IED followed by small arms fire.
A convoy of three vehicles was ambushed west of Mosul causing injury to three soldiers.
A military convoy was hit by a command detonated IED which damaged two vehicles and wounded two soldiers.
A car bomb exploded prematurely near a coalition base in Erbil resulting in two wounded personnel and fatalities.
A convoy was attacked near Habbanniyah (SE of Ramadi), by armed men firing RPGs; two vehicles were destroyed and one soldier was wounded.
LOCAL DRIVERS
If using local drivers for convoys and journeys around the country it is imperative that they are fully briefed and monitored during the journey purely for driving safety. There have been numerous accidents due to excessive speeds and poor driving skills.
All drivers employed by organisations should be first aid trained and if necessary given additional driver training. Speak to our advisors – they can implement this.
IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices)
A convoy consisting of 12 vehicles was on its way to Baghdad airport when it hit a daisy chain IED. Daisy chains are several IEDs linked along the same wire. Once detonated they all explode covering a much wider area resulting in a higher percentage of damage to personnel, vehicles and property.
IEDs are continually being deployed in a variety of methods as mentioned in previous reports. Again the advice is to stay away from any unidentified object that could house and explosive device.
A convoy of five security vehicles was hit by an IED, resulting in three wounded soldiers.
An IED exploded in front of a security force convoy, shattering a windscreen and injuring one soldier.
OTHER INCIDENTS
Several RPG attacks on security forces in Baghdad and one of the coalition air bases have occurred over the last few days.
There was an RPG attack on a patrol near Mosul, wounding one soldier.
A hand grenade was thrown from a passing civilian vehicle injuring one soldier.
A patrol was hit by an IED, which was followed up by small arms fire.
A grenade was thrown under a security force vehicle wounding three soldiers.
Another grenade was thrown from a crowd at a moving vehicle patrol, wounding one soldier.
Two attacks consisting of a mortar attack and an IED occurred against the coalition forces in the area of Hilla.
Coalition forces conducted a raid near Ramadi on suspected foreign terrorists possibly linked to the UN headquarters attack in August.
Demonstrations occurred south of Basra led by clerics from Najaf. Tyres were set alight on streets and small arms were fired in to the air.
Two suspects were searched and found to have grenades in their bags.
PERSONAL SAFETY
Reports are drifting in and being discussed around Baghdad of impending attacks on soft targets such as hotels and residences where security forces and Westerners live.
An attack involving mortars was instigated on a water treatment plant. Two soldiers were injured.
Be aware of potential incidents such as a small group starting a fight or argument among themselves, as they will hope the local security guards/coalition forces will go over and try to intervene in what is basically a diversion. This will then allow another member of their group to either plant a bomb, shoot at, or use an RPG on the approaching security forces.
Following the incident last week in which coalition forces shot Iraqi security personnel, it is worth mentioning that there is and will be armed civilian personnel operating legitimately throughout the region. They will be in civilian clothes and carrying weapons, and they have a job to do. It is with concern that this type of event can so easily happen again in the future, not just to coalition force personnel and local Iraqi police but also to civilians who do not belong to any military organization but openly employ armed civilian security guards. If using armed security personnel it is definitely recommended that they keep a low profile and all weapons are concealed. You and they could become a potential target, and not just from terrorists.
It must be pointed out again that due to the intensity of attacks on coalition forces they have every right to be on the edge looking for and eliminating any potential threat, even if this results in fatalities. Be cautious and aware of the security forces and respect what they are doing and need to do. They have a difficult job against what sometimes is a virtually invisible enemy.
EXTERNAL BUREAUS
This relates to offices and accommodation away from the hotels, which all other media organizations/NGOs/aid agencies and business are using. If using these premises, be they rented or purchased, a security appraisal needs to be conducted. What to look for is, not only does it have a gate that can lock but also the overall aspect of security including high buildings that overlook the premises, which can offer a person, armed with a rifle or RPG the opportunity to fire on your building from a vantage point.
Points to consider are:
Secure area: (i.e. on the same street as embassies/local dignitaries). If selecting this type of area you will need to weigh up the pros and cons of doing so – the pros of residing in this type of area is that the security is already in place with military and police and possibly some form of road blocking system. The cons with buildings like embassies is that these could well become a target if they are not already, but could be in the immediate future. The decision whether to reside in this area needs seriously thinking about. As with the majority of embassies, high-ranking residences and some buildings where Westerners reside, these can and could be under surveillance while the terrorist/assailants form some sort of plan. These places are termed as ‘high profile’, and will be known to most locals and, of course, potential attackers.
Structure: The overall structure of the building is of importance and should be checked prior to any possible occupation. All doors/windows/walls/strong points should be looked at to ensure they have not suffered any damage from previous bomb raids/explosions, etc. If the structures have any severe cracks or parts of walls where explosions may have taken place, the advice is not to occupy that building.
Secure Streets: If the area has armed guards/police patrolling the area 24 hours a day, then this will be a great deterrent to any potential attacker but also could be an attractive target for ‘drive by attacks’. These types of streets will also have ‘vehicle security checkpoints’ (VCPs), also reducing the threat of a possible attack or planting of under-vehicle improvised explosive devices (UVIED).
Perimeter Fencing/ Walls: These ideally should be high enough to conceal the building from street view and passers-by. If using high net fencing, consideration should be given to using a fine mesh material that can be hung on the inside enabling occupants to look out but restricting passers-by from looking in. The fixing of razor wire or equivalent on top of all walls and fencing should be considered.
Main Gates/Side Gates: All should be lockable from the inside possibly using two large bolts and padlocks and even large chains if necessary. The netting mentioned above can also be used on the inside of these gates. (Ideally over-watched by CCTV, etc – read below). The side gate could also be used for an emergency exit if the house was under attack from elsewhere.
Security Lighting: This should be mounted on every corner of the building and above all entry/exit points if possible. Lights should be sited as high as possible ideally covering all arcs and where possible overlapping light beams when shone on the ground.
Security Cameras/CCTV: Expensive but ideally should be in operation. Should be sited as close to the lighting as possible and monitored 24 hours a day. It can be manpower intensive but worth it, as cameras can give early warning of a potential security incident. Also ideal for the observation of vehicles and personnel in the immediate vicinity of the property to keep an eye on any potential vehicle bombs or planting of suspect devices, such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
Transport Areas: All vehicles used by the organization should ideally be secured inside the premises and watched over by cameras and lights. They should all be locked even when in the secure compound. This area should be well screened from outside view as this enables loading/unloading of all equipment, etc to go unobserved.
Door Locks: Should be two on each external door where possible and backed if needed by a button code panel. (Button code locks are also ideal for side gates and main exit gates. This panel will need some form of small screen around it so no onlooker can see the number being punched in. Door locks/bolts should also be fitted on the inside of all external doors for added security.
Spy holes for Doors: These are of benefit as you can see who it is prior to answering the door and should be fitted where possible.
Intercom: These prove very useful, especially if the entrance is on a lower level than where you are actually residing. Working in conjunction with the CCTV proves to be invaluable.
Windows: These ideally should have some form of bars on the inside of them especially if sited on the ground floor. All windows should be able to be locked. All windows throughout the building should be fitted with clear shatterproof material (similar to 3M). This ‘stick-on plastic’ lets light in but reduces any glass fragmentation in case of an explosion or gunshot. Using bomb blast curtains is not a real option if you require daylight to work in.
Rooftops: If the building has a flat open rooftop this could be potentially dangerous if it is overlooked. These open type of rooftops can/have been ideal targets of opportunity by snipers/attackers. You may need to secure the top with fencing and netting or if there are walls already surrounding the rooftop then razor fencing should be fixed. If the roof joins the neighbor’s roof, it is advisable to build a screen/wall to improve the security and isolation of your property. Again, if necessary use wire on top of the screen/wall.
Escape Route: Where possible an escape route should be implemented and known by all occupants in case of attack either from personnel or mortars or equally important from a fire. Ideally this should be a side door and have internal locks that can easily be opened in a hurry. This route should lead to the perimeter fencing/walls for rapid emergency exit. Ideally the property should offer two alternative escape routes once out of compound. A lot of buildings back on to the river and so escape options will be limited.
Rope Ladders: If the building does not have a fire escape already in situ it is recommended to install a rope ladder type system to enable escape from upper rooms. These can be purchased on the civilian market.
First Aid Kits/Fire-Fighting Equipment: All bureaus should have a ‘bureau first aid kit’. This contains much more equipment than a personal first aid kit as it is designed to cater for large numbers of people. They also contain sutures and IVs. However, these kits must be located in the building and all occupants should know where it is. The contents and use of contents should be known by all and not left to certain individuals. All individuals should have attended a recognized first aid course dealing with these items.
All buildings should have sufficient fire-fighting equipment to deal with all types of fires from electrical to combustible. All occupants should know the whereabouts of these and how to use each item. In conjunction with this equipment, all power supplies, (main switches/fuse box, etc), should be known to all in case of emergency for power shut down. Fire blankets should be installed as well as extinguishers and attention is drawn to Burns Kits, which should either be with the main ‘bureau first aid kit’ or close by.
Building Alarm: Standard use in any household or offices. Ideal both for isolating individual areas or when the entire building is to be evacuated for the short term. Acts as a good deterrent especially with the alarm box fitted externally.
Portable Smoke Alarms: Should be fitted in every room. Battery operated; they should be tested on a daily basis.
Personal Escape Hoods: Should be purchased and issued to every member of your organization even if occupying a hotel. These masks are designed to help a person to escape a fire/smoke environment and any area involving hazardous and toxic air. They are pocket sized and one size fits all.
Torch (flashlight): Essential if the power goes, ideally have one in every room.
Compact Search Mirrors: These are ideal for checking under the vehicle for suspect devices such as UVIEDs. They are compact, lightweight and designed to be carried in the pocket, etc. They also have a pencil torch fitted, which directs light to the area being searched.
Communications: Hand held radios are essential if you have teams deploying from your building on assignments. It is strongly recommended that a good quality radio is used, one that can be used with a base station. With the antenna on the roof of the building this greatly improves the distance between the mobile team and the base station back at your building.
Local Guards: There are pros and cons in the use of armed local security guards. The pros are improved security to the building and compound and a deterrent to any would be attacker. The cons are that use of local armed guards will draw local residents’ attention to the property if it never had armed guards before. Some local guards are quite happy to sit at one entrance and fall asleep in the shade and especially at night. Selection of these guards is important. If they are paid and treated as cheap labor they will provide cheap security. Therefore it is important that you look after these local armed security personnel and if need be hire enough to rotate on a shift system. Ideally these local armed guards should come under your advisor’s control so he can sort out the rota and job priorities for them, and also ensure they are doing the job correctly by discreet visits.
The headings above are not exhaustive. Remember that the threat may not only be from an attacker or attacking force but also internally from fire or other hazards.
FLIGHTS
AIRSERV
Amman based
Strict luggage control
35-seater (15-seater)
Flying from Beirut to Baghdad and also Amman to Baghdad.
Contact no’s: Oliviere – +962 796 748067
Andre – 796 941365
Thuraya Sat phone – Slava +8821677443562
SUMMARY
Terrorist groups are continually emerging throughout the country, organizing and conducting attacks on coalition forces, whether static or mobile. There have been reports of attacks on Westerners including media, NGOs and aid agency personnel. Most of these attacks tend to be in a crowd situation or food convoys. It is still advisable to definitely stay away from all religious shrines, etc.
Be cautious, observant and aware of your surroundings at all times. Remember: if it doesn’t feel right – get out!
Many thanks to the Centurion advisors in Iraq for providing information for this Field Report, and the safety advice they are offering. For more information, Centurion Risk Assessment Services.