



10 June 2004

### Flashpoints

**Baghdad (Sadr City, Green Zone, airport road), Mosul, Kufah, Balad, Baqoubah, Karbala, Najaf**

The following highways and routes should be considered extremely hostile:

- The roads from Baghdad to Fallujah have reopened although they remain extremely dangerous. A number of checkpoints have also been erected on the routes and are being manned by both Coalition Forces (CF) and the Iraqi police.
- The Baghdad to Amman Highway remains particularly dangerous and should be avoided if at all possible.
- The route to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) is extremely dangerous. Restrictions have been applied to this route.
- Routes in the vicinity of Najaf, Kufah and Karbala should be avoided, as should those around al-Kut.
- Amarah is likely to witness further attacks and travel on roads to and from the city should only be undertaken with caution.
- The route from Baqoubah to Mosul has been subject to a number of attacks over the past 48 hours and should be considered dangerous.
- While these routes have been highlighted, it should be noted that transit throughout Iraq is dangerous and no route can be guaranteed as being safe.

### Projections

The situation in Fallujah is disturbing. Intelligence suggests a marked increase in the number of armed persons on the streets of the city and that there are emerging rifts between various insurgent groups in the city. The Fallujah Brigade appears to have been singled out and a concerted propaganda campaign launched against it, classifying the Brigade as 'collaborators'. Experience suggests that the security situation in Fallujah could once again deteriorate, possibly significantly. Of concern is that the policy of replacing the Coalition presence with an Iraqi police and security presence in restive areas such as Fallujah is currently being adopted in Najaf, Karbala and Kufah. It is therefore highly possible that a similar pattern of events will come about in these locations in the coming months.

The targeted assassination of a senior member of the Badr Brigade and senior figure in the largest Shi'a political grouping, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Shahir Faisal Shahir could be a prelude to further such attacks. He was killed immediately after an agreement was reached on the disbandment of a number of militias operating in Iraq. While it is not believed the disbandment itself was ever realistically going to immediately improve the security situation in the country, it is likely that further assassinations of leading militia figures will occur in an attempt to put an end to the agreement and induce inter-militia clashes. In this regard, it is possible that the assassination could have been the work of al-Qaeda or an indigenous affiliate as it is highly unlikely that a SCIRI official would have been assassinated by fellow Shi'as (even from different militias such as the Mehdi Army). It should not be forgotten that Musab al-Zarqawi pledged to induce civil war and also to target the Shi'a population.

The 3 June declaration by KONGRA-GEL rebel group (formerly the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK, fighting the Turkish government) that its five-year ceasefire would come to an end on 1 June is likely to have implications for Iraq's security. Members of the group are thought to be in hiding in the Qandil Mountains

particularly the area of Rania, northern Iraq. Given the anger of the PUK and KDP over the failure of the UN Security Council to endorse an area of autonomous Kurdish control in its latest Resolution, it is possible that KONGRA-GEL may carry out acts of violence, most likely against Coalition and Iraqi Governing Council targets. The PUK's perceived closeness to the US may also make it a viable target for KONGRA-GEL.

## Summary

The three remaining Italian hostages held by insurgents in Iraq were rescued on 8 June by Coalition Forces. A Polish citizen who was kidnapped last week was also set free. None of the four hostages appeared to be injured. The men were rescued from their captors south of Baghdad. Their release came as a great relief amid fears for the men's, particularly the Italians', lives following the execution of a fourth Italian Fabrizio Quattrochi in April of this year.

The security situation throughout Iraq remains dangerous and no area can be classified as safe. Attacks have persisted throughout the country against both people and infrastructure. Despite the release of the four hostages detailed above, there remains a real risk of kidnap. A number of attacks involving the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been reported and such devices remain a preferred weapon. As was evident earlier in the week such devices are often planted in vehicles and it should be remembered that it is not always battered old vehicles that are used in this regard. New and prestige vehicles are also known to be used, especially if they are more likely to blend in with their surrounds (for example affluent urban areas). Targeted assassinations have occurred in the past 48 hours in the form of drive-by shootings and a mortar attack is known to have killed at least 12 members of the Fallujah Brigade. Elsewhere in the country the usual array of attacks and incidents of violence have persisted and in addition to the above, small arms fire (SAF) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) have been used by insurgents.

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## Areas of continued concern

- It is feared that Mosques are potential hot spots for demonstrations, and possibly suicide and other explosive attacks in the coming days and weeks
- Hotels remain at risk of attack, particularly those providing residence to Western personnel, including those in the 'Green Zone', despite increased security
- All facilities relating to the energy industry in Iraq remain at risk of attack, including offices and vehicles
- Police stations, local government and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) facilities continue to be the target of demonstrations and suicide attacks
- The homes and offices of those involved in the political development of Iraq, those of personnel involved in the former regime (i.e. low level Ba'athists) and those of tribal leaders are believed to be under an increased risk of attack or assassination











## The following other buildings and facilities are consistently at risk:

- Any building, element of infrastructure or machinery involved with the reconstruction effort (particularly the energy industry)
- Coalition facilities of all nationalities (inhabited by contractors, NGO workers, diplomatic and military personnel)
- Civic buildings, particularly police stations, diplomatic offices and those of NGOs and media organizations
- Any convoy/vehicle carrying personnel from the media/NGOs or indeed contractors and diplomatic

staff is at risk of attack at all times

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	1-9	Generally stable and secure
	10-19	Instability
	20-29	Hostile
	30-39	Highly unstable
	40-49	Widespread militancy
	50-59	Low intensity conflict
	60-69	Advanced guerrilla war/civil war
	70-79	Limited conventional war
	80-89	Regional war
	90-100	Total war (sub-nuclear)

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